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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Dans cet article je m'intéresse à la raison pour laquelle les organisations publiques comme privées ont 
recours à une hiérarchie informationnelle. Je propose un modèle théorique qui explique l'existence des 
hiérarchies comme étant un outil nécessaire pour aider les agents à récolter le plus d'information 
possible étant donné leurs capacités limitées. Ainsi, à cause de cette limite intellectuelle et/ou 
computationnelle des agents économiques au sein des organisations, le contrat complet est trop 
complexe pour être mis en oeuvre dans les organisations à moins d'utiliser une structure pyramidale 
pour gérer l'information. En fait, les hiérarchies permettent de récolter plus d'informations à moindre 
coût. Les contributions de l'article sont les suivantes: 1) il suggère une raison à l'existence des 
hiérarchies; 2) il développe une mesure de la quantité d'information qui doit être gérée au sein d'une 
organisation; 3) il mesure de manière endogène le nombre optimal de niveaux au sein de la hiérarchie 
organisationnelle étant donné les capacités limitées des agents; 4) il rationalise le fait d'avoir les 
individus les plus talentueux au haut de la pyramide; 5) il donne une explication au fait d’avoir un seul 
président dans l'organisation; et 6) il explique comment le nombre de niveaux et le nombre de 
gestionnaires varient lorsque l'entreprise grandit ou lorsque les tâches des agents changent. 
 




Why do larger corporations have more layers in their hierarchy? My contention in this paper 
is that hierarchies arise because economic agents have limited ability to anticipate and ascertain 
every possible contingency they are faced with. As a result, the complete contract may become too 
complex (or too costly) to devise and manage directly. My contention in this paper is that hierarchies 
may help a limited-ability principal (the organization's president) collect all pertinent information 
about the productive elements in the organization so that the complete is again possible. The 
contributions of the paper are six-fold: 1) it suggests a reason why hierarchies exist; 2) it develops a 
measure of the quantity of information that needs to be processed at each level of the organization; 3) 
it measures endogenously the optimal number of layers in a hierarchy given the players' ability to 
process information; 4) it provides a rationale for having the most talented individuals at the top of 
the hierarchy; 5) it offers an explanation for the existence of an unique president in an organization; 
and 6) it explains how the number of layers and of managers may vary over time as the company 
grows and/or the players' ability changes. 
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1.1 Motivation
Almost every organization in the economy, whether public or private, closely-held or widely-held,
for-proﬁt or not-for-proﬁt, has an internal structure which may be called hierarchical. All organiza-
tions have a residual claimant1 in the sense of Alchian and Demsetz (1972). Typically, the residual
claimant is the agent who has the greatest incentive to monitor. In their theory of the ﬁrm, Jensen
and Meckling (1979) argue that as soon as one departs from the owner-manager paradigm, agency
costs are encountered so that ineﬃciencies arise. These agency costs are typically associated with
having agents reveal their information to the principal, or with ways to assure that one ﬁrm stake-
holder does not extract undue rents from the other stakeholders. Since one of the most prevalent
agency costs is linked to the human capital / labor production within the ﬁrm, most studies in
economics and ﬁnance have concentrated on two distinct levels of pyramid-like organizations: The
top and the bottom.
Research that focuses on the top part of an organization in a for-proﬁt organization is known as
the CEO compensation literature. Research focusing on the bottom part of the organization may
be loosely agglutinated under the general terms wages and workers. In both cases the academic
literature is quite extensive as it is evident in the entire set of Handbooks of Labor Economics. Other
ﬁrm stakeholders have also found they day in the spotlight: Creditors, government, stockholders,
blockholders and ﬁnancial institutions. Basically all ﬁrm stakeholders, from capitalists to productive
laborers, from managers to creditors and from the government to diﬀerent types of capitalists have
been studied in major academic journals in both economics and ﬁnance.
One group of stakeholders that have largely been ignored in the economic literature are those
who, within a ﬁrm, sit between top management and the productive laborers. With few exceptions
such as Lindbeck and Snower (2000), middle management has not been the focus of much attention
by economists. In contrast, the management literature has devoted more attention to the study of
the strengths and weaknesses of middle management in organizations. This is particularly true in
the industrial relation, organizational behavior and human resource literature.2
One may then wonder why economists have such little interest in the study of middle manage-
ment? This apparent lack of interest is somewhat surprising given that middle managers represent
an important sub-group of the labor force. As a case in point, Radner (1992) reports that, in the
United States, managers at all levels of every organization represent roughly one-third of the labor
1See, however, Hollander (1903) for a very early critique of the residual claimant theory in economics.
2See, for example, Cannings (1988) in labor relations, Floyd and Wooldridge (1992) and Guth and Macmillan
(1986) in strategy, and Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1997) and White et al. (1999) in information systems.
1force. The proportion of managers in the labor force has steadily increased in the last eighty years
as organizations have increased in size.
One possible explanation for the general lack of interest in the study of middle managers is
that they are not “real workers” (see Radner, 1993). This may be associated with the fact that
most managerial duties in an organization involve the information processing rather than decision
making (see Radner, 1992). As a result, the managers’ major purpose in any organization is to relay
information back and forth between the top and the bottom layers of the organizational hierarchy.
This then begs the question of how valuable is information processing for an organization? Also,
what type of information and how much information needs to be processed? The economic literature
appears to oﬀer few answers to the value, the type and the sheer volume of information that ﬂows
within a ﬁrm. The goal of this paper is to oﬀer an answer to these questions based on an economic
approach to organizational design.
To that end, I present a model of information asymmetry in which productive agents (the
“workers”) possess information that needs to reach the principal (the “president”). Any agents’
compensation is linked to the type of information that reaches the upper echelon of the organization.
Because I shall assume that one agent’s information is possibly correlated with the information of
other agents, a principal (or the managers or the agents’ supervisors) may use one agent’s report to
condition the compensation of the others. If it is feasible to write very long contracts that can take
into account any and all possible contingencies (in other words, if the principal is able to write a
complete contract), then by the revelation principle (see Myerson, 1982) a centralized organization
(1 principal, N agents) can do no worse than a decentralized organization.
Very long (and complete) contracts may be too costly to implement, however, as shown by
Williamson (1975). Similarly, Melumad et al. (1997) assert that when the agents’ tasks become
more complicated, complete contracts become longer and more costly to write.
When the supervision of the workers becomes more and more diﬃcult, the president of the
organization may need to hire managers to screen and oversee the information transmitted by the
agents; this is the foundation for the creation of an informational hierarchy within the organization
(see Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994). On the downside, when the principal creates a hierarchy, he
delegates some power to managers; a process that is indubitably costly, if only in terms of giving
a wage to the manager. On the up-side, the use of a hierarchy increases the ﬂow of information
within the organization. As a result, a ﬁrm’s president whose limited ability prevents him from
keeping track of all possible contract contingencies will need to rely on managers as a mean to
complete the contact between him and the productive workers.
The complexity of middle manager compensation may be due to the fact that it is very hard to
2deﬁne their duties from one ﬁrm to another. Radner (1992) oﬀers a list of nine tasks that managers
are asked to do in organization, including 1- observing the environment and the result of past
actions, 2-processing and communicating the information, and 3- monitoring the actions of other
ﬁrm members. These are the three tasks that are asked of managers in my paper.
In essence, my paper provides a new insight into the reason why hierarchies exist based purely
on the need to complete the contract that binds the company’s president with the workers.
1.2 Contribution and Results
As I shall demonstrate, complete contract compensation schemes quickly become extremely complex
when information is correlated across agents, when the number of agents bounded by the terms
of the contract increases and when the number of possible types increases. Complete contracts
may even perhaps be too complex to be implemented realistically so that ﬁrms resort to simple
compensation schemes such as pay scales, loose monitoring policies and experience-based promotion,
instead of spending resources in designing the complete contract. Although simple schemes may
allow agents to extract rents from the principal, these rents may conceivably be smaller than the
cost of writing the complete contract.
Rather than oﬀering a justiﬁcation for the use of simple compensation schemes, my results
oﬀer a rationale for the existence of hierarchies in an organization. When individuals have limited
abilities to manage complex contracts (see Geanakoplos and Milgrom, 1991, Radner, 1992, Baniak
and Cukrowski, 1999, Orbay, 2002), I ﬁnd that hierarchies become a way to transmit information
more eﬃciently. Through the use of a hierarchy, it becomes relatively less complex for managers
in the upper echelon of the organization to gain access to the information of lower echelon agents.
The number of echelons in the hierarchy then depends on the individuals’ ability to manage the
many diﬀerent provisions of the complete contract.
My paper develops a complexity measure based on the number of parameters that need to be
speciﬁed in a complete contract between a principal and the agents under the assumption that
agents are risk averse, have limited liability and possess correlated information about their types.
Given this complexity measure, I present how informational hierarchies come to be as the ﬁrm’s
president needs to aggregate all the information that the agents possess. The algorithm used allows
me to observe what happens to an organization when the complexity of the productive agents’
tasks increases, when the number of productive agents in the organization increases and when the
technology at the disposal of the managers allows them to supervise more productive agents. As a
result, I am able to explain why the shape of organizations diﬀers from one industry to the next,
how organizations evolve over time and why larger organizations have more managerial layers.
3The model I present does not address directly the question of the monetary cost of implementing
a given hierarchy. I am instead concerned with the manner in which an organization can structure
itself so that all the information is transmitted to the penultimate principal in the organization.
To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to suggest that hierarchies exist to complete contracts in
a world where agents possess correlated private information and where managers have a limited
ability in keeping track of all contract contingencies.
More speciﬁcally, the contributions of the paper are six-fold: 1- it suggests a reason why hier-
archies exist; 2- it develops a measure of the quantity of information that needs to be processed
at each level of the organization; 3- it measures endogenously the optimal number of layers in a
hierarchy given the players’ ability to process information; 4- it provides a rationale for having the
most talented individuals at the top of the hierarchy; 5- it oﬀers an explanation for the existence of
an unique president in an organization; and 6-it explains how the number of layers and of managers
may vary over time as the company grows and/or the players’ ability changes.
The paper is constructed as follows. In the next section I present how my paper ﬁts in the
literature on contract theory under asymmetric information, on contract complexity and on hi-
erarchies. I present in Section 3 the algorithm used to measure how much information must be
transmitted in the organization so that contracts become complete. In Section 4 I show how the
use of hierarchies enable the principal to complete contracts. Section 5 presents predictions as
to the shape of diﬀerent organizations, the impact of better technology on the organizations, and
the compensation of players within an organization and across organizations. Finally section 6
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the model and further insights into the problem.
2 Standing on the Shoulders of Giants
2.1 Contracts and Hierarchies
Segal (1999) deﬁnes a contract to be complex if it is rational for players ex ante to ignore contingen-
cies that may occur ex post. Another interpretation could be that complexity arises in a contract
if it is too costly for players to keep track of all its possible contingencies. As a result an agent
may disregard a certain number of contingencies. This has given rise to the incomplete contract
literature.
The incomplete contract literature is extensive, and I do not want to get into it.3 My focus
is not on contract incompleteness, but rather on the high cost of keeping track of all the possible
contingencies of a contract. A recent paper by Rasmusen (2001) presents a model where contract
3See for example Hart and Moore (1988) and Maskin and Tirole (1999).
4incompleteness stems from the cost of reading (rather than writing) complete contracts. What I
shall term contract complexity will merely be the number of variables that need to be speciﬁed
in a complete contract. As such I deviate from the computational economic view of complexity
(see Anderlini and Felli, 1994, 1999) and focus instead on developing a complexity measure as in
Dye (1985). In short, contract complexity in my model stems from the “bounds on individuals’
capabilities for information processing and decision making.” (Radner, 1992, page 1384). As a
result, my deﬁnition of contract complexity is in line with that of Melumad et al. (1997) who write
“Since each contingency has to be speciﬁed in advance as part of the formal contract,
...., contracts with more contingencies are more expensive to write and understand.”4
Following the transaction-cost literature, a contract will become too complex when a player does
not have the intellectual capacity to cope with all the contingencies that must be included in the
contract. In that respect, my approach to contract complexity is similar to Dye (1985), Geanakoplos
and Milgrom (1990) Radner (1993), Melumad et al. (1997), Segal (1999) and Orbay (2002).5
My approach is also related to the one used by Radner and VanZandt (1992) and Bolton and
Dewatripont (1994) although I shall use a static rather than dynamic approach to the information.
I model the players’ limited ability very naively: Their ability is limited by an upper bound on the
number of contract parameters one can keep track of.6 As the number of contingencies rises above
the maximum a player is capable of handling, it becomes necessary either to have more players in
the organization, or to accept that the contract remains incomplete. When the choice is to hire
more and more players, the creation of a hierarchy may become the only way to complete contracts
within the organization.
The compensation of middle management has usually been viewed as a contracting problem
within a hierarchy. As such Williamson (1967) concludes that the size of an organization, and more
precisely the number of layers in the organization, is an important determinant of a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency
to transmit information within the organization. Information transmission eﬃciency becomes even
more important in the hierarchy when the agents’ actions are not completely observable. Following
that line of thought, the sole purpose of the organizational hierarchy I present is to transmit infor-
mation from the organization’s lower echelons to its upper echelon, as in Bolton and Dewatripont
4Melumad et al. (1997), page 259.
5My measure of complexity has some of the drawbacks exposed in Hart and Holmström (1987) and Anderlini and
Felli (1999). For example my deﬁnition, and that of Dye (1985), of what is complex and what is not is arguably ad
hoc since I deﬁne complexity as the number of variables (or the number of contingencies) that need to be determined
to complete the contract. This does not cause too much problem when the contingencies are discreet as here, but may
be troublesome when contingencies are distributed on a continuum. See also Melumad et al. (1997) for a counterpoint
to the Hart and Holmström (1987) critique.
6Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) refer to this as “maximum ﬂow return”.
5(1994), Baniak and Cukrowski (1999) and Orbay (2002).
To illustrate, I will use the following example throughout the paper. Suppose an organization
where lower echelon players (say the agents) have correlated information valuable to an unique upper
echelon player (say the principal) so that the latter wants to design a contract that will extract as
much information as possible from the former knowing that such information is correlated. This
example applies to the case of a company president who must handout year-end bonuses to her
managers or to the case of an university principal (no pun intended) who must decide which faculty
member gets a pay raise this year. These bonuses are based on the manager’s performance which
is not known to the president. To gather that information, the president can choose to engage in
a round of costly auditing or she can rely entirely on the managers’ information or both.
2.2 Information Extraction and Surplus
Organizations routinely perform audits and use other forms of costly monitoring to gather infor-
mation. Organizations defend the use of costly monitoring by arguing that it helps reduce adverse
rent-seeking behavior by its members. Another argument is that revelation of information allows
the upper echelon player to secure for himself the economic surplus created in the organization.
In such a case the contract typically speciﬁes a probability of audit in certain states of the world
and a penalty if the audit reveals the agent’s message to be false (see Townsend, 1979, Baron and
Myerson, 1982, and Mookherjee and Png, 1989). Truth-telling is then induced through the use of
regular credible audits.7 Unfortunately audits are costly so that it would be welfare-enhancing to
extract all the information without having to resort to costly audits.
The approach pioneered by Crémer and McLean (1985, 1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992) -
CMMR hereafter - makes use of the agents’ correlated information to show that truth-telling is
possible without having to sacriﬁce either eﬃciency or surplus extraction (see also Aoyagi, 1998,
and Brusco, 1998). What CMMR call full surplus extraction (FSE) is then possible even if the
correlation between the agent’s information is small, but not zero. FSE is achieved by making
an agent’s compensation independent of his announcement, but dependent on the other agents’
announcement. As information is correlated, one agent’s information should be related to the other
agents’ information.
Under certain conditions FSE is possible without the principal having to resort to costly audits.
Why then is costly monitoring and performance evaluations so pervasive in the economy? The
reason is that the compensating scheme devised in CMMR quickly becomes extremely risky for
7See Boyer (2003) and Khalil (1997) for the case where commitment is not possible and Krasa and Villamil (2000)
for general issues dealing with renegotiation.
6the agents. More to the point, the contract in CMMR is designed so that, albeit with some small
probability, an agent that has achieved a very good performance could be submitted to a hefty
penalty (or the opposite) depending on the other agents’ reports. Since CMMR rely heavily on
the risk neutrality of agents and on the absence of limited liability, they are able to design a
mechanism that includes arbitrarily high mean preserving spread transfers to which risk neutral
agents are indiﬀerent. Unfortunately, if agents are risk averse as in Robert (1991) or have limited
liability as in Demougin and Garvie (1991), such penalties and bonuses turn out to be too large to
induce participation. As a result, risk aversion and limited liability are possible explanations for
the frequency of audits.
The eﬃciency of a compensation scheme depends ultimately on the agents’ risk aversion and
their information’s degree of correlation. Auditing, which is another tool to induce truth-telling,
should therefore be used more frequently when we have reached the limits of contract design;
that is, when risk aversion is high and when information correlation is low. When information is
independent from one agent to the next, auditing an agent provides no information on another. On
the other hand the eﬀectiveness of auditing increases as the correlation increases. This is obvious




The following sequence is used in the paper to model information asymmetry:
• First, a complete contract is signed between a principal and risk averse agents that have
limited liability so that the wages they receive must be non-negative. All players have the
same information at this point. The contract speciﬁes an audit strategy conditional on the
agents’ message, and a wage to be paid to each agent given the messages they sent to the
principal and the result of the audits.
• Second, the agent performs a costless task.
• Third, each agent learns privately what his type is.
• Fourth, each agent sends a simultaneous message to the principal concerning his type.
• Fifth, the principal decides what subset of agents to audit.
• Sixth, payoﬀs are made to all players given the parameters of the contract signed initially.
73.2 Information structure
Take the case of a company president who must handout year-end bonuses to her plant managers
who possess private information that she values. In handing out the bonuses the president can rely
entirely on her managers’ reports or she can decide to invest in an audit. This information concerns
the state of the world in which the managers are. There is no eﬀort to be made to produce the
task, so that there are no ex ante moral hazard problems. Moreover no agent knows its type before
signing the contract so that there is no adverse selection problem either.
The type of problem at hand is known as ex post moral hazard (see Picard, 1996, Bond and
Crocker, 1997, and Boyer, 2003) in the insurance literature, variance investigation (see Kaplan,
1975, Baiman and Demski, 1980, and Lambert, 1985) in the accounting literature and the regulation
of monopolies with unknown costs (see Baron and Myerson, 1982, and Khalil, 1996) in the industrial
organization literature. Others yet refer to this problem as one of moral hazard in reporting
(Lambert, 2001). In general, we may say that this is a problem of costly state veriﬁcation as in
Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985).
Consider an organization composed of a principal (player 0) and N agent (players 1 through
N). Agents are risk averse and their utility function over ﬁnal wealth U (.) is twice diﬀerentiable.
The principal oﬀers each agent n a take-it-or-leave-it contract; the game ends and the agent receives
payoﬀ U (0) if he leaves it.
I restrict my attention to a symmetric organization in the sense that every player’s task at
a given level of the organization is the same. In other words, at any given level, every player is
required to supervise the same number of underlings or the same number of machines.
After having accomplished his task each agent n learns his type τn drawn from some discrete




t ≥ 0. All agents are assumed to have the
same number of types, but not necessarily the same set of types. In other words the cardinality of
Υn is T for all n although Υn  = Υn′
when n  = n′. Without loss of generality, I model an agent’s
type as a monetary cost that enters his utility function so that U′
τ (.) < 0.
Because every agent simultaneously and privately sends a message to the principal about his
type, the message proﬁle m has N elements, one for each agent. For any possible message proﬁle, an
audit policy is enacted. The audit policy reveals information tj. Agent n’s wage, noted wn (m,tj),
is then contingent on the message proﬁle and on the information produced by the audits. Agent
n’s payoﬀ is simply Un (wn − τn). Hence, for a given type τn ∈ Υn {τn
1,...,τn
T} the lowest payoﬀ
any agent may receive is Un (−τn) because wages are restricted to be non-negative.
83.3 Contract design
When information is correlated across agents, a new level of complexity is added to the problem,8
because of all the diﬀerent combinations of agents and types. What is left to ﬁnd is the number of
variables that must be speciﬁed in the complete contract.
Auditing is costly to the principal; I restrict the auditing technology to yield constant returns
to scale at any level in the hierarchy. Each audit costs some amount c. The audit technology is
perfect in that it reveals correctly the agent’s information. All audits are simultaneous. An audit
policy speciﬁes which agent or agents are to be audited as a function of the message proﬁle.
Let π i be the probability that some subset  i of players is audited. Any subset  i is then any
of the 2N elements of P (N), the power set of the N agents,9. For example, if there are N > 8
players, the probability that the subset composed of agents 1, 5 and 8 is audited is given by π{1,5,8}.
Since auditing each individual agent costs c, we need to know how many agents are in each subset.
Let ωi represent the cardinality of each subset  i. Given wages paid wn, n = 1,...,N, and the
audit policy, the objective function of a principal who would want to minimize the expected cost











      
audit function
The decision variables in this minimization problem will therefore be the wage function wn (m,tj)
as well as the auditing strategy π i, with
 2N
i=1 π i = 1. Both will depend on the message proﬁle
received by the president and on the prior distribution of agent types. Clearly, truth-telling by all
types of agents is achieved at the expense of some costly audits. At the margin, the principal would
want to economize by reducing the probability of auditing. Unfortunately, reducing the probability
of performing an audit has impacts on the principal’s expected payoﬀs.
In my model, truth-telling is obtained at a smaller cost than in McAfee and McMillan (1995)
and Melumad et al. (1998). Because agents compete over the information they have to transmit
and because the agents’ information is correlated, truth-telling is thus obtained through the eﬃcient
design of a compensation contract and of an audit policy that takes into account this correlation.
3.3.1 Number of types and audit policies
Each agent n ∈ N observes his type τn = τn
k ∈ Υn {τn
1,...,τn
T}, where, without loss of generality,
τn
k ≥ τn
k−1. There are thus TN type proﬁles in the organization since I assumed earlier that the
8See Krasa and Villamil (1994) for example.
9Recall that the power set is the set of all possible subsets, including the complete set and the empty set. With
N players, there are 2
N possible subsets.
9cardinality of Υn is T ∀n ∈ N. Each agent then sends message mn to the principal.
The audit policy chosen by the principal speciﬁes which subset of agents is to be audited
conditional on the message proﬁle m sent by all the agents. The message proﬁle thus has N
elements. Using the Revelation Principle I can restrict my attention to truthful messages (i.e.,
mn ∈ Υ{τn
1,...,τn
T}). With simultaneous audits, an audit policy then speciﬁes a set of probabilities
πη such that only the subset η of agents will be audited, with
 
ηεP(N) πη = 1. Given there are
P(N) = 2N possible subsets of managers, we only need 2N − 1 audit probabilities since audit
probabilities must sum to one.
For a given type proﬁle there are thus K = 2N −1 audit probabilities to be determined. Given





3.3.2 Number of wages
The principal compensates each agent using a wage wi that is contingent on the messages sent
to her by the agents and on the result of performed audits. A wage to agent i contingent on the
proﬁle of messages m and on the information a produced by the audits conducted on the subset η
of managers is noted wi
η,a(m).
Let us count the number of wages that must be speciﬁed following a message proﬁle m. For each
subset η of audited agents, there are A|n| possible results. The number of subsets in P(N) that have











(T + 1)N possible contingencies to consider.10 Given there are J = TN type proﬁles for which N
wages must be speciﬁed, the complete contract must specify NJL = NTN (T + 1)
N wages.
3.3.3 The complete contract
The complete contract in this model is composed of an audit function and of a wage function. The
audit function has TN  
2N − 1
 
elements whereas the wage function has NTN (T + 1)
N elements.
As a result, in an organization composed of N agents who can each be any of T possible types, a








In the supposedly simple 2 2     , that of two agents (N = 2) with two types (T = 2), the




+ 2(2 + 1)
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= 4(3 + 2   9) = 84 vari-
10Another way to get that result is to augment the type set of each agent by a “null” type which represents the ex
post type of an agent that has not been audited. Then, either the agent is audited, with T possible outcomes, or he
is not audited and we say that he has the null type. There are then (T + 1)
N possible outcomes to the audits.
11One can reduce the number of parameters assuming the symmetry of agent types and Nash implementation. This
does not aﬀect the results of the paper, only the calculation of the number of parameters. See Boyer and Gonzalez
(2004) for a discussion of the symmetry in the agents’ types and of Nash implementation.





+ 6(6 + 1)
6
 
= 32,937,129,792 variables. The following table computes the num-
ber of variables that need to be speciﬁed in a complete contract as a function of the number of
types T and of the number of agents N.
Table 1. The Complexity of the Complete Contract.
C T
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 3 8 15 24 35 48
N 2 11 84 315 848 1,875 3,636
3 31 704 5,373 24,448 81,875 223,776
4 79 5,424 84,159 643,840 3,249,375 12,466,224
5 191 39,872 1,251,693 16,031,744 121,596,875 653,697,216
6 447 283,968 17,961,831 384,258,048 4,374,984,375 32,937,129,792
The entries are the number of parameters that need to be speciﬁed in a complete contract
as a function of the number of agents (N) and of the number of types (T) of each agent.








It is interesting to note that the complexity of the complete contract increases faster as the
number of managers increases than when the number of types increases. For example, it is relatively
less complex to design a contract when there are four agents that may be any of six types (N = 4,
T = 6) than to design a contract when there are ﬁve agents than can be of only four types (N = 5,
T = 4) or a contract with six agents and three types (N = 6, T = 3) or even a contract with eight
agents and two types (N = 8, T = 2). This gives us a ﬁrst glimpse as to why hierarchies are better
at completing contracts. We will come back to this later.
3.4 Complete contract complexity
It is clear in Table 1 that the number of parameters that need to be speciﬁed in a complete contract
increases very rapidly as the number of possible types and of agents increases. What I shall call the
complexity of a contract will merely be the number of variables that need to be speciﬁed. As stated
in the introduction, I deviate from the computational economic view of complexity as presented by
Anderlini and Felli (1994, 1999). As a result I am, as Dye (1985), enumerating the contingencies
that the contract must consider.
114 Hierarchies
An interesting implication of contract complexity is that it gives a rationale for hierarchies when
players have a limited computing ability such as in Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1990) Radner (1993),
Melumad et al. (1997), Segal (1999) and Orbay (2002). In particular, I will assume that a player’s
ability is deﬁned by the number of contract parameters that he is able to keep track of. I shall ﬁrst
present three examples of hierarchies, then I will present more general results. In all cases, I will
assume a symmetric organization so that any player at a given level of the organization is faced
with the same task complexity.
4.1 Three examples
4.1.1 Example 1
Suppose that some individuals have the intellectual capability of managing at most C = 40,000
variables (low-ability), while others have the intellectual capability of managing C = 2,250,000
variables (high-ability). If each machine is operated by one person (let’s call this person a worker)
and if machines can either spit out a good quality widget or a bad quality widget, then any worker
may be of only two types: Good or Bad.




+ N (T + 1)
N
 
, the maximum number of workers
any low ability individual can supervise is ﬁve, since C (2,5) = 39,872 < 40,000 = C. This means
that if the organization has ten machines, two low-ability individuals need to be hired to manage
these ten workers. Each manager will then be any of TN = 25 = 32 types because each supervises
ﬁve workers who can be of two types. This means that the company president will need to have








2,233,344 variables. A high-ability individual is capable of handling this.
It thus becomes optimal to have two low-ability individuals be the managers, and the high-
ability individual be the company president. This pyramidal organization allows to have a complete
contract so that all the information is revealed. In contrast, if the president wanted to oversee all
workers himself, he would need to have the intellectual ability to manage C (2,10) = 605,709,312
variables, which is much greater than the intellectual ability of managing 2,233,344 variables when
a three-level hierarchy is used. As a result, this organization (let us call it Organization 1 in Figure
1) has ten workers at level-0, two level-1 managers with ability C = 40,000 and one president with
12ability C = 2,250,000.
Figure 1: Organization 1
President
Manager
W W W W W
Manager
W W W W W
The organization’s president has minimum ability C (32;2), the two managers
have minimum ability C (2;5), and the ten workers (W) have ability C (2;1).
4.1.2 Example 2
Suppose now that the organization triples its work force so that there are now 30 workers in the
organization. Again each worker oversees an unique machine that produces either a good widget
or a bad widget, so that each worker’s type can be either of two types.
From example 1, we know that six C (2,5)-ability managers are needed to supervise these
30 workers. The organization then needs three C (32,2)-ability managers to supervise the six
C (2,5)-ability managers. Each C (32,2)-ability managers may then be any of TN = 210 = 1024
types, because their type depends only on the workers’ set of types. With three C (32,2)-ability
managers, the company president will need to have the intellectual ability to handle a contract that
has C (1024,3) variables. Is this optimal?
Suppose instead that the company president decides that he wants to oversee the six C (2,5)-
ability managers directly. Because each C (2,5) manager can be any of 32 types, the president’s
intellectual ability must be at least equal to C (32,6), which is greater than C (1024,3). If he wants
to oversee the workers directly, his intellectual ability must C (2,30), which is again greater than
C (1024,3).12
Finally, instead of hiring six C (2,5)-ability managers to oversee the workers, the company
president may choose to hire three C (2,10)-ability managers. These C (2,10)-ability managers
may be any of 210 = 1024 types. The company president then needs to have the intellectual ability
to handle a contract that has has C (1024,3) variables. This is the same required ability than in
the previous three layer organization. Based only on his computing ability, the company president
12The reader may verify that C (1024,3) = 3,469E + 18, C (32,6) = 8,320E + 18, and C (2,30) = 6,632E + 24.
13should then be indiﬀerent between Organization 2.1 and Organization 2.2 in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2.































Three hierarchies for one organization with the required minimum competence at each level.
The three managers in Organization 2.2 require an intellectual ability of C (2,10); this ability is
greater than the one required of the upper managers in Organization 2.1, which was C (32,2). The
choice of the company president between the two types of organizations will then depend on the
availability of C (2,10)-ability managers on the labor market, and on the relative costs (the wages
that need to be paid to the managers) of each organizational structure.
Assuming that managers of all abilities are available on the labor market, an absence-of-arbitrage
argument allows me to state that, in equilibrium, the president must be indiﬀerent between orga-
nizations 2.1 and 2.2. As a result, the cost of hiring three C (2;10) managers must be the same
as hiring three C (32,2) managers and six C (2,5) managers. Thus, the managers’ salary must be
proportional to their computing ability relative to the other agents’.
Suppose a third organization (Organization 2.3) were possible in which the number of managers
is only two, but each have the intellectual ability to manage 15 workers each. Their intellectual














so that it is quite possible that the company president will not be able to






As a result, if the company president’s ability is limited to CP = C (1024,3) and the managers’
ability is limited to C (32;2), then the organization will need to have four levels in its hierarchy:
thirty workers, six lower (level-1) managers, three upper (level-2) managers and one president. This
14means that Organization 2.1 should be observed in the economy. It is interesting to note that in all
three organizations, the minimum ability that is needed increases with the level in the hierarchy.
This result could not be predicted by Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1980).
If we look at Organization 2.1 and compare it Organization 1 presented in the previous example,
it is worth noting that an increase in the number of workers from 10 to 30 has three interesting
implications as to the shape of the organization.
1. The number of layers in the organization increases (from 3 to 4);
2. Even though the number of workers is three times as high in Organization 2.1 than in Orga-
nization 1, the number of middle managers (managers that lie between the president and the
workers) has more than tripled (from 2 to 9);
3. The president of Organization 2.1 needs to be more qualiﬁed than the president of Organiza-
tion 1 so that she must, presumably, command a higher salary.
4.1.3 Example 3
Let us now set the number of workers in the organization to 210. Suppose managers (excluding
the president) must be divided over three levels. How should the president divide the managers to
minimize the sum of the computing abilities necessary to complete the contract?
Let N0 be the number of workers than need supervision. Let N  represent the number of
managers at level  , with   = 1,...,M. The president sits on level M so that NM = 1. Let S 
represent the number of individuals at level   − 1 that are being supervised by each individual
at level  , with   ≥ 1. The number of level   managers is then N  =
N −1
S  = N +1 × S +1, for
  = 1,...,M − 1. It clearly follows that the product of all supervised individuals must be equal to
the number of workers: Π S  = N0.13 The total number of managers, including the president, is
given by ΣM
 =1N  = ΣM
 =2ΠM
η= Sη.14
Because the organization is required to have only three levels (so that M = 4), we need to ﬁnd
the S  such that Π4
 =1S  = N0. When N0 = 210, it is clear that the S  must be 2, 3, 5, 7 since
2×3×5×7 = 210. The question that remains is how these supervised individuals are distributed
13To see why, rewrite N  =
N −1
Sn as S  =
N −1












N1. Simplifying, we are left with Π S  =
N0
NM . Since NM = 1 (the president), it follows
that Π S  = N0.
14To see why, substitute for N  =
N −1
S  and expand the sum to yield Σ
M











Substituting for N1 =
N0






















η=1Sη = 1. The number of managers is then given by Σ
M





15in the hierarchy so as to minimize the computing costs. Let us start with the upper layer, N3, and
work our way down.
Looking at level 3, the president has a choice of supervising SM =
• seven managers that can take on 230 types,
• ﬁve managers that can take on 242 types,
• three managers that can take on 270 types,
• two managers that can take on 2105 types.


































result, the company president will choose to have only SM = 2 managers to supervise, albeit of any




. This means that there are N3 = NMSM = 2
level-3 managers.
Looking at layer 2, each level 3 managers have a choice of supervising S3 =
• seven managers that can take on 215 types,
• ﬁve managers that can take on 221 types,
• three managers that can take on 235 types.

























. Each of the N3 = 2 level-3 managers therefore needs to supervise S3 = 3




. There are thus N2 = N3S3 = 6 level-2 managers.
Looking at layer 1, each level 2 managers have a choice of supervising S2 =
• seven managers that can take on 25 types,
• ﬁve managers that can take on 27 types.





















to supervise S2 = 5 level-1
managers. There are therefore N1 = N2S2 = 30 level-1 managers.
Finally, looking at the workers, each of the N1 = 30 level-1 managers will supervise S1 = 7
workers, which requires ability C (2,7). Or course, there are N0 = S1N1 = 210 workers who each
supervise one machine that may produce a good quality or a bad quality widget.













+ 30 × C (2,7)
One can verify that this structure is the one that minimizes the necessary abilities in the organiza-





It follows that the organization has the following structure: one president at level 4, two senior
vice presidents at level 3, six junior vice-presidents at level 2, thirty managers at level 1 and 210
workers at level 0.
4.2 Optimal structure
The computational cost of acquiring and transferring information is but only one aspect of the cost
encountered by the organization’s president. He must also consider the cost of giving wages to the
organization’s middle managers. For a given managerial wage structure the president will minimize
the organization’s wage cost by ﬁnding a hierarchical structure that utilizes everyone’s computing
ability to the fullest. Under this condition, an organization should also choose a structure that
necessitates the lowest computational ability.
4.2.1 Minimizing the computing cost
As before, assume that the president is restricted to use a symmetric structure in the sense that
every manager at a given level must have the same number of tasks to oversee. Assume the workers
may take on T0 types, so that the two-level hierarchy necessitates an ability equal to C (T0,N0),
where N0 is the number of workers in the organization.16 I want to ﬁnd a way for the principal to
minimize his computational cost. His programme is then to ﬁnd the number of level   managers,
















+ 30 × C (2,7)
16Because of symmetry, the number of managers at the diﬀerent levels (N1,N2,N3,...,NM) is deﬁned so that
Π
M
 =1N  = NW.
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j=1 Sj = N0.17 By minimizing the
total computational cost in his organization the president is able to higher managers that command
a lower compensation because they are less skilled
4.2.2 Minimizing wage cost
Instead of minimizing the computational cost in the organization, the president may instead decide
to minimize the total wages that must be given to all agents in the organization. Suppose that on
the labor market a manager of quality Ci (Ti,Ni) commands a wage of w[Ci]. The organization’s









































   M










j=1 Sj = N0. The only diﬀerence
between the two approaches is that one focuses on the computation cost whereas the other focuses
on the wage cost.
4.2.3 Wages and abilities
The two approaches can be combined by saying that the organization’s president will want to
minimize the computational cost while keeping wages lower than some amount. In other words,
minimizing the function A while keeping W smaller than some W.
The results of Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) is related to this limited ability of handling
complicated contracts. Hierarchies are an eﬃcient mechanism of information transmission when
individuals are limited in their ability to manage complex tasks. The introduction of a hierarchy in
an organization allows to have lower management monitor an optimal number of tasks, and have
upper management monitor an optimal number of lower managers. The number of echelons in the
hierarchy then depends on the individuals’ ability to manage the many diﬀerent provisions of the
complete contract.
5 Applications, implementation and discussion
5.1 Information and wages
Returning our attention to the numbers presented in Table 1, we note an apparent trade-oﬀ between
the number of agents and the number of types. This trade-oﬀ exists even if contract complexity
rises faster with the number of agents than with the number of types. Such a trade-oﬀ implies that
organizations may prefer to have less agents that oversee more machines than to have more agents
that oversee less machines.
For example, suppose that machines can either produce a good quality widget or a bad quality
widget. A manager who oversees the quality of an unique machine and who must report such a
quality to the president can make only two types of report: Bad or Good. A manager who oversee
two machines can make four types of report: Bad-Bad, Bad-Good, Good-Bad, Good-Good. A
manager that oversees three machines can make eight types of reports: Bad-Bad-Bad, Bad-Bad-
Good, Bad-Good-Bad, Good-Bad-Bad, Bad-Good-Good, Good-Bad-Good, Good-Good-Bad, and
19Good-Good-Good. In fact, when a manager must supervise G machines that can either produce a
good quality widget or a bad quality widget, it is easy to show that there are T = 2G reports that
can be made to the president. This means that the number of types of a manager will depend on
the number of machines he needs to supervise. The question then becomes whether it is better to
have N
x managers overseeing the G machines or to have N agents overseeing G
x machines.
From a point of view of complexity, it will always be better to reduce the number of agents to
the minimum as we can see in Table 1. This reduction in complexity must, however, be weighted
against the higher wage that needs to be paid to the manager. As the number of managers is
increased, the president is better equipped to evaluate the performance of the diﬀerent managers
since she receives more information. And because the president has more information, it may
allow her to reduce the wage paid. As a result, although the complete contract is more complex
when there are more managers, the president may prefers it because it allows her to extract more
information.
Take the extreme case of two machines whose quality is perfectly correlated. If one manager
oversees all machines, the manager can send three reports. With three types and one manager, this
gives us 15 parameters to specify in the complete contract. A wage greater than the reservation
wage must then be paid and costly audits need to be conducted periodically. If two managers
oversee one machine each, the president can achieve full surplus extraction by paying managers their
reservation wage and by never auditing because the manager types (widget quality) are perfectly
correlated. In fact, as in Boyer and González (2004), the greater the correlation between the
diﬀerent types (whether positive or negative), the less costly it is to induce truth-telling because
audits are conducted with lower frequency and wages are smaller. The complexity of the contract
is not aﬀected, however, by the amount of correlation between the agents’ information.
An organization must then ﬁnd the right balance between complexity and information. As the
complexity of the contract increases, more information is extracted so that lower wages can be paid
and the audit cost is incurred less often.
5.2 Task complexity
In all examples presented so far the task that is required of workers in the organizations is quite
simple: Either the machine produced a high quality or a low quality widget. In reality, the tasks
of workers are much more complicated than that. One may then wonder what happens to the
structure of the organization when the workers’ task becomes more complex? Task complexity may
be measured by the number of types each agent may be so that the question then becomes what
happens to the organizational form when the number of possible types increases?
20CLAIM. The complexity of the complete contract rises faster as we climb the corporate
ladder.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the complexity of the complete contract increases in both the
number of agents and the number of possible types; both ∆C
∆T and ∆C
∆N are positive. Second, we can
also see that ∆2C
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which is clearly positive since T ≥ 1 and N ≥ 1. As a result, the marginal increase in the complexity
of the contract as the task becomes more complex increases with the number of agents. This means
that the ability required of managers who sit at the upper echelons will need to increase much
faster than the ability that is required of lower echelon managers.
If managers are already at their maximum ability in terms of the number of agents to supervise
and the number of tasks that each agent is required to do, then an increase in the complexity of the
tasks that is required of agents will induce the hiring of more managers. Although this is obvious
because of the deﬁnition of limited ability, what is not as obvious is that the number of upper
managers will increase faster than the number of lower managers.
Suppose an organization has N0 workers that can be any of T0 possible types. The organization
is restricted to have M layers so that there is one president at level NM. The N1 level-1 managers,
who supervise S1 = N0
N1 workers each, need to have a computing ability at least equal to C (T0,S1).
The N2 level-2 managers, who supervise the S2 = N1
N2 level-1 managers must have computing ability
at least equal to C (T1,S2), where T1 = T
N0
0 . The N3 level-3 managers, who supervise the S3 = N2
N3
level-2 managers must have computing ability at least equal to C (T2,S3), where T2 = TN1
1 = TN0N1
0 .
In general, the N  level-  managers, who supervise the S  =
N −1
N  level- −1 managers must have
computing ability at least equal to C (T −1,S ), where T  = T
N −1
 −1 = T
N0N1   N −1
0 . Let us look at
what happens to task complexity between levels 1 and 2.
Say complexity of the task of the workers goes from T0 to T0 +1. The computing ability of the
level-1 managers then goes from C (T0,S1) to C (T0 + 1,S1). Using the formula given in Table 1,
the rate of increase in the required ability, assuming the number of managers does not change, is
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18It is clear that this equation does not make sense technically since the number of types and the number of agents
is not continuous. Nevertheless, the point I want to make is the same.
21or, put diﬀerently,
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I want to show that the rate of increase in equation 2 is greater than the rate of increase in
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when all the parame-
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Therefore, the minimum ability needed in an organization increases faster at the upper level of
the organization than at the bottom when the complexity of the task of the workers increases. And
because one could presume that salaries are proportional to the required ability of the managers,
it is not surprising then that the salary paid to top management personnel has grown much faster
than the salary of the workers in the economy.
5.3 Only one president
The limited ability approach I develop in this paper also allows to explain why a corporation (or any
organization for that matter) should have only one president that oversees all the ﬁrm’s operations.
22In fact, not only do shareholders (or the other residual claimants) necessitate less computing power
to oversee one president rather than many, the increase in the needed computing power when the
complexity of the task increases is smaller.
CLAIM. It is eﬃcient for an organization to have only one president because it mini-
mizes the supervising cost of stakeholders.
Consider the computing ability needed to oversee the behavior of one president who sits at
level M. Whatever the number of levels in the organization and the number of managers that
the president supervises, the number of possible types the president can take is TM = T
N0
0 , where
N0 is the number of workers in the organization and T0 is their number of types. The minimum













this is a quadratic function in the number of types of the president.
If the organization decides to appoint two copresidents instead, then the number of possible
types of each copresidents is T
N0
2
0 . The computing ability needed to over see the two copresidents
that may be any of T
N0
2











































































Another interesting aspect of having an unique president is that the complexity function may
be written as a simple quadratic function of his possible types. This means, amongst other things,
that the change in the rate of increase of the contract’s complexity is a constant, whatever the
number of possible types he may take. Moreover, the rate of increase in the complexity of the
contract as the number of types that the president may take is much smaller than in the case of
multiple presidents. In the example used in this section, the (approximate) rate of increase in the










































The same can be said about the number of workers in the organization. The contract’s com-
plexity increases by a much slower rate when there is only one president at the helm. With one
















































What this means is that it is much easier for shareholders to adapt the president’s compensation
contract to changes in the environment when he is by himself. When more than one individual is
at the helm of the organization, it is much more diﬃcult to know where the ship is heading.
5.4 Better technology
Each manager’s ability to keep track of many possible contingencies depends on three factors, two
of which are the number of agents and the number of types. A third factor that I did not mention
explicitly so far in the paper is how the managers are endowed with such or such computing ability,
or how that ability may change with time or with the available technology. For instance, what
impact did the information technology revolution of the late 20th century have on organizations?
CLAIM. If the level of information technology in the organization increases, then: 1-
the size of the organization will increase (more workers); 2- ratio of managers-to-workers
will drop; and 3- the number of lower managers will decrease faster than the number of
upper managers.
Assume people in the economy are initially endowed with diﬀerent computing abilities Ci (T,N;α),
where α is some technology parameter such that ∂Ci
∂α > 0 (i.e., better technology allows greater
computing abilities). Say, for example, that Ci (T,N;α) =
 
Ci (T,N)
 1+α or that Ci (T,N;α) =
(1 + α)Ci (T,N), with α ≥ 0. It would be interesting to see what impact an increase in the
technology has on the size of the organization and on its structure.
24Suppose that the organization is initially composed of N0 workers that can be any of T0 types,
and that the initial technology is such that α = α0 = 0. Moreover, suppose the number of levels
in the organization is M. The number of managers in the organization is then ΣM−1
 =1 N . At each










To see why, note that an organization that has N0 workers of T0 possible types needs to hire
N1 C (T0,S1;α0)-ability level-1 managers to supervise these workers, with S1 = N0
N1. Since these N1
managers may be any of TS1





-ability level-2 managers are needed
to supervise them, with S2 = N1
N2. These N2 level-2 managers can then can any of T
S1S2
0 types.






to supervise the level-2 man-
agers, with S3 = N2







supervise the N −1 level-( -1) managers. Finally, given this setup, the company president who sits






to supervise the top level managers
who sit upon level M − 1. As a result the number of managers in the organization is given by
ΣM−1
 =1 N .
Suppose that a technological improvement increases the level-1 managers’ ability to supervise
workers without altering the number of types each worker may be. In other words, a change in
α increases the computing ability of the managers without aﬀecting T0. What will happen to
the organization’s structure? Prior to the technological improvement the level-1 managers’ ability





. Because the better technology increases implicitly
the level-1 managers’ ability, but does not alter the set of worker types, the only impact on the
organization must come from a change in the number of workers each level-1 manager is able to
supervise. In other words, an increase in α that does not change T0 must result in an increase in
S1. Because S1 is given by the ratio of the number of workers in the organization to the number
of level-1 managers, each level-1 managers can increase the number of workers he supervises either
through an increase in the number of workers in the organization (N0 increases), or though a
reduction in the number of level-1 managers (N1 decreases).
Say the new number of workers that each level-1 manager is able to supervise when the new
technology is put in place is S′
1 (I shall note by •′ the numbers when the technology level is α1).
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general, I then have that the number of level-  managers (N′
















25In other words, when the number of level-1 managers does not change (i.e., N1 = N′
1) even
though the number of workers in the organization increases from N0 to N′
0, their ability must
increase from C (T0,S1) to C (T0,S′





N1. Will the number of level-2
managers increase? If the number of level-2 managers remains the same, what must the technology

































  if their number does not change. Assuming that the number of level-2 managers re-
mains constant (N′















































  , then a technological increase that allows lower level managers to

















  , then a technological increase that allows the number of upper managers
to remain constant will allow the organization to layoﬀ lower managers. For this to be the case, I



































































Expanding the terms S1, S′
























































































With all variables integers, this inequality usually holds for N′
0 > N0 ≥ N1 ≥ N2 ≥ 1 and T > 1.
There are circumstances where this inequality does not hold, two of which warrant some attention.
26In the ﬁrst case, when T0 = 1, the second term is always equal to 1 whereas the ﬁrst term is always
greater than 1 since N′
0 > N0. This case is not very interesting since it concerns the case where
agents can be only of 1 type, which does not make much economic sense. In the second case, when
N2 = N1, we have that the level-2 manager that oversees only one level-1 manager will beneﬁt
much more from a technological gain. This second case is more interesting as it tells us that a leap
in information technology will allow the ﬁrm’s residual claimant to supervise the organization’s
president at a lower cost (in terms of computing ability).
A leap in the information technology means that the structure of the organization will change.
Even if the number of workers does not change, the number of managers in the organization will
shrink so that the number of levels may be reduced. As a result, even if there is no tangible
production gain to technology (i.e., the number of workers and the number of possible worker types
remain the same), there is an eﬃciency gain at the information processing level so that the number
of managers and the number of levels in the organization may be reduced.
6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to examine what happened to the design of a complete contract when
agents must ﬁle a report based on information that is correlated. The traditional literature basically
studies only two cases. In the ﬁrst case, it is possible to extract all the information from the
managers using arbitrarily large transfer schemes (see Crémer and McLean, 1988, and McAfee
and Reny, 1992). In the second case, information is independent from one manager to the next so
that it is impossible to design a contract that extracts all the information from the managers (see
Townsend, 1979). In fact, the optimal contract is such that some rent must be paid to the manager
who is best qualiﬁed. The case of correlated information with auditing and risk averse managers
has not been addressed.
The complexity associated with designing contracts where information is correlated across man-
agers is astonishing. In simple settings such as two managers having two possible types, a contract
must specify at least 84 variables. When the number of managers and the number of types increase,
the number of variables that need to be speciﬁed grows exponentially.
The implications of my results are two-fold. First, the complexity issue raised implies that fully
speciﬁed contracts may be too expensive to implement in reality. This may explain why corporation
resort to pay scales and subjective wording in their labor contracts. It may be less precise and it
may allows some workers to shirk, but it is certainly easier and less costly to implement.
The second implication of my results is that it gives a rationale for hierarchies. When individuals
have a limited ability to handle complex contracts in the sense that they can only keep track of a
27limited number of variables, it may be better for the organization to have a pyramidal structure
since it increases the ﬂow of information in the organization.
I do not pretend to oﬀer a normative view of whether complete contracts within an organization
are preferable to incomplete contracts. As such I do not claim that hierarchies create value. Indeed,
hierarchies may still destroy value, as in McAfee and McMillan (1995) if the wages paid to middle
management are higher than the losses incurred by the principal if contracts remained incomplete.
Also, the gains associated with completing the contract may not outweigh the ﬂexibility associated
with incompleteness, as in Melumad et al. (1997). Nevertheless, the model I present oﬀers a
possible explanation as to the existence of hierarchies: They allow agents that have limited ability
to gain access to all the information that is available to them
.
287 References
1. Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz (1972). Production, Information Costs and Economic Orga-
nization. American Economic Review, 62: 777-795.
2. Anderlini, L. and L. Felli (1994). Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of
Nature. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 1085-1124.
3. Anderlini, L. and L. Felli (1999). Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Contracts. Theory
and Decision, 46: 23-50.
4. Aoyagi, M. (1998). Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with
Budget Balance. Journal of Economic Theory, 79: 142-151.
5. Baiman, S. and J. S. Demski (1980). Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and
Control Systems. Journal of Accounting Research, 18: 184-220.
6. Baniak, A. and A. Cukrowski (1999). Organizational Restructuring in Response to Changes
in Information Processing Technology. Review of Economic Design, 4: 295-305.
7. Baron, D. P. and R. B. Myerson (1982). Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs.
Econometrica, 50: 911-930.
8. Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont (1994). The Firm as a Communication Network. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 94: 809-840.
9. Bond, E. W. and K. J. Crocker (1997). Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of
Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Veriﬁcation and Endogenous Monitoring.
Journal of Public Economics, 63: 239-254.
10. Boyer, M. M. (2003). Contracting under Ex post Moral Hazard, Costly Auditing and Principal
Non-Commitment. Review of Economic Design, 8: 1-38.
11. Boyer, M. M. and P. González (2004). Optimal Audit Policies with Correlated Types. Eco-
nomic Theory, 24: 325-334.
12. Brusco, S. (1998). Unique Implementation of the Full Surplus Extraction Outcome with
Correlated Types. Journal of Economic Theory, 80: 185-200.
13. Cannings, K. (1988). The Earnings of Female and Male Middle Managers: A Canadian Case
Study. The Journal of Human Ressources, 23: 34-56.
2914. Crémer, J. and R. P. McLean (1985). Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a
Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent. Econometrica, 53: 345-361.
15. Crémer, J. and R. P. McLean (1988). Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Domi-
nated Strategy Auctions. Econometrica, 56: 1247-1257.
16. Demougin, D. and D. A. Garvie (1991). Contractual Design with Correlated Information
under Limited Liability. Rand Journal of Economics, 22: 477-489.
17. Dye, R.A. (1985). Costly Contract Contingencies. International Economic Review, 26: 233-
250.
18. Floyd, S. W. and B. Woolridge (1992). Middle Management Involvement in Strategy and
Its Association with Strategic Type: A Research Note. Strategic Management Journal, 13:
153-167.
19. Gale, D. and M. Hellwig (1985). Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period
Problem. Review of Economic Studies, 52: 647-663.
20. Gale, D. and M. Hellwig (1989). Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt.
International Economic Review, 30: 3-31.
21. Geanakoplos, J. and P. Milgrom (1991). A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial
Attention. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 5: 205-225.
22. Guth, W. D. and I. C. MacMillan (1986). Strategy Implementation Versus Middle Manage-
ment Self-Interest. Strategic Management Journal, 7: 313-327.
23. Hart, O. and B. Holmström (1987). The Theory of Contracts. In T.F. Bewley (ed.) Advances
in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress, Cambridge University Press.
24. Hart, O. and J. Moore (1988). Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica, 56:
755-785.
25. Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
26. Kaplan, R. S. (1975). The Signiﬁcance and Investigation of Cost Variances: Survey and
Extensions. Journal of Accounting Research, 13: 311-337.
27. Khalil, F. (1997). Auditing without Commitment. Rand Journal of Economics, 28: 629-640.
3028. Krasa, S. and A. Villamil (1994). Optimal Multi-Lateral Contracts. Economic Theory, 4:
167-187.
29. Krasa, S., Villamil, A.: Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable. Econo-
metrica, 68: 119-134 (2000)
30. Lambert, R. A. (1985). Variance Investigation in Agency Settings. Journal of Accounting
Research, 23: 633-647.
31. Lambert, R. A. (2001). Contracting Theory and Accounting. Journal of Accounting and
Economics. 32: 3-87.
32. Lindbeck, A. and D. J. Snower (2000). Multitask Learning and the Reorganization of Work:
From Toyloristic to Holistic Organization. Journal of Labor Economics, 18: 353-376.
33. Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1999). Unforseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. Review
of Economic Studies, 66: 39-56.
34. McAfee, R. P.. and J. McMillan (1995). Organizational Diseconomic of Scale. Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, 4: 399-426.
35. McAfee, R. P. and P. J. Reny (1992). Correlated Information and Mechanism Design. Econo-
metrica, 60:395-442.
36. Melumad, N., D. Mookhejee and S. Reichelstein (1997). Contract Complexity, Incentives and
the Value of Delegation. Journal of Economic and Management Strategy, 6: 257-289.
37. Mookherjee, D. and I. Png (1989). Optimal Auditing, Insurance and Redistribution. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 104: 205-228.
38. Orbay, H. (2002). Information Processing Hierarchies. Journal of Economic Theory, 105:
370-407.
39. Picard, P. (1996). Auditing Claims in the Insurance Market with Fraud: The Credibility
Issue. Journal of Public Economics, 63: 27-56.
40. Pinsonneault, A. and K. L. Kraemer (1997). Middle Management Downsizing: An Empirical
Investigation of the Impact of Information Technology. Management Science, 43: 659-679.
41. Radner, R. (1986). The Internal Economy of Large Firms. The Economic Journal, Issue
Supplement, 96: 1-22.
3142. Radner, R. (1992). Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing. Journal of Economic LIterature,
30: 1382-1415.
43. Radner, R. (1993). The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing. Econometrica,
61: 1109-1146.
44. Radner, R. and T. Van Zandt (1992). Information Processing in Firms and Returns to Scale.
Annales d’économie et de statistique, 25/26: 265-298.
45. Rasmusen, E. B. (2001). Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading
Costs. Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 1 no. 1, Article 2.
46. Robert, J. (1991). Continuity in Auction Design. Journal of Economic Theory, 55: 169-179.
47. Sappington, D. E. M. (1983). Limited Liability Contracts Between Principal and Agent.
Journal of Economic Theory, 29: 1-21.
48. Segal, I. (1999). Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts.
Review of Economic Studies, 66: 57-82.
49. Townsend, R. M. (1979). Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State
Veriﬁcation. Journal of Economic Theory, 21: 265-293.
50. White, R. E., J. N. Pearson and J. R. Wilson (1999). JIT Manufacturing: A Survey of
Implementations in Small and Large U.S. Manufacturers. Management Science, 45: 1-15.
51. Williamson, O. (1967). Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size. Journal of Political
Economy, 75: 123-138.
52. Williamson, O. (1975). Market and Hierarchies. The Free Press, New York.
53. Williamson, O. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press, New York.
32